

INFLUENCE OF MANIPULATIVE ELECTORAL TECHNOLOGIES ON THE POLITICAL VALUES OF THE POPULATION

Based on the analyzed material, the author proves that manipulative electoral technologies have a very important influence on the political values of the population and the results of their voting during the elections. In a post-industrial society, political manipulation, electoral technologies, and the power of the information become crucial in manipulating the society, since the vast majority of citizens perceive the world around them through the electoral process. The 2019 presidential election in Ukraine demonstrated a combination of manipulative, “dirty” and “clear” electoral technologies. And the media and the Internet, which are involved in this process, have now become one of the most important public institutions. The experience of political campaigns on Facebook in the United States and Europe shows that the right audience and the right messages aimed at it usually help to achieve success. The results of the 2019 presidential election in Ukraine showed how new political technologies affected their course, and helped one of the candidates win. In this election, new technologies clashed with the traditional ones that have been operating in Ukraine for decades, and the results showed that the new ones are much more effective.

The article notes that it is necessary to introduce “clear” electoral technologies into the political field of Ukraine, taking into account its social, political and economic reality and the global game rules. They must be created by intensive means, designed and implemented as science-intensive social engineering products.

Keywords: Ukraine, political values, “clear” and “dirty” manipulative electoral technologies, mass media, the Internet

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ВПЛИВ МАНІПУЛЯТИВНИХ ВИБОРЧИХ ТЕХНОЛОГІЙ НА ПОЛІТИЧНІ ЦІННОСТІ НАСЕЛЕННЯ

Автор, на основі проаналізованого матеріалу, доводить, що на політичні цінності населення, на результати його голосування в ході виборів досить важливий вплив мають маніпулятивні виборчі технології. В постіндустріальному суспільстві політичне

маніпулювання, виборчі технології та влада інформації стають вирішальними в управлінні суспільством, оскільки переважна більшість громадян сприймає навколишній світ саме через виборчий процес. Президентські вибори 2019 р. в Україні продемонстрували поєднання маніпулятивних, брудних та чистих виборчих технологій. А ЗМІ та мережа Інтернет, які причетні до цього процесу, перетворилися нині на один з важливих суспільних інститутів. Досвід політичних Фейсбук кампаній США і Європи свідчить, що правильно обрана аудиторія та зорієнтовані на неї потрібні меседжі, зазвичай допомагають досягти успіху. Результати президентських виборів 2019 р. в Україні показали, як нові політичні технології вплинули на їх хід, і допомогли одному з кандидатів вибороти перемогу. Нові технології зіткнулися у цих виборах з традиційними, які в Україні діяли десятиліттями, і результати виборів показали, що нові значно ефективніші.

У статті наголошено, що у політичне поле України необхідно впроваджувати чисті виборчі технології, враховуючи її соціальні, політичні й економічні реалії та правила гри світового оточення. Вони мають бути створені інтенсивними засобами, спроектовані і реалізовані як наукомістка соціотехнічна продукція.

Ключові слова: Україна, політичні цінності населення, маніпулятивність та брудні виборчі технології, ЗМІ, мережа Інтернет

Relevance of the topic. The analysis of problems related to political values as a basis for influencing mass consciousness is quite relevant. After all, values significantly influence the political process. This is an integrated framework for small and large social groups and the entire nation. The concept of “value” in this context means a special reality that is not directly related to needs. The needs of people in politics represent the life world of a person in the structure of motivation. They are dynamic and change depending on the state of the subject’s life relations. And political values form the inner world of a person. Values point to the dynamic aspects of individual experience, the invariant aspects of the political experience that the individual learns. The values have a special status. “By giving an object the status of a value,” V. Malakhov writes, “a person, as if subjecting it, recognizes the right the object for its own voice.”

The specifics of political values of society are expressed by political tradition. Its core is the most stable and “persistent” political value that lives in generations. The power of tradition is immense. They control people’s minds at the level of the unconscious. C. G. Jung believed that this is the collective unconscious. However, this fact does not deny the existence of conscious representations of the subject about what is valuable for him, expressed in the concept of “value orientation” or aspects of orientation that bind it to compliance with certain norms, standards, and selection criteria.

Analysis of the main trends that operated during the election campaign to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine in 2014. A specific feature of the post-Soviet societies is the

de-actualization of values. It is often that modern values do not stand up to competition with the values of the “bright past”. A sociological survey conducted by the Saint Petersburg Research Institute and the Razumkov Center for Economic and Political Research in 2004 and 2006 shows that up to 60% of respondents believe that the priorities of the Soviet-era value system are better than the modern ones. In the same way, the features of a “classic” Soviet man of the 1950-70s win significantly in public opinion in comparison with the portrait of the modern time person¹. This is what various active politicians use, although it is losing its relevance nowadays.

The analysis shows that in the parliamentary elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (VRU) in 2014, there was an important trend – de-ideologization of political forces. It is difficult to divide Ukrainian parties into “right” and “left”, and even the division into “pro-Russian” and “pro-European” is blurred in the election programs. Even S. Tigipko’s “Strong Ukraine”, which focused on the voters of Eastern Ukraine, promised to fight for European markets. There are two exceptions to this trend: the Communist party of Ukraine (KPU) and “Svoboda” party. These parties were balancing on the verge of electoral barrier. The KPU is the most pro-Russian party that stands for “Slavic unity”, despite the fact that even former “regionals” have already moved away from such rhetoric. “Svoboda” is constantly focused on the fact that it is anti-Russian and anti-Communist. The KPU is the only one that stands for the status of the second state language for the Russian language. Svoboda is the only one that promotes radical Ukrainization, with creating a quota (78%) for Ukrainian-language products in all media and the rejection of all Soviet holidays and symbols. These parties deviate from the liberal mainstream even more in the economy. Progressive tax, luxury taxes and the return of strategic enterprises to the state – traditionally “left-wing” promises are only present in the programs of the Communist party and “Svoboda” – seemingly different in ideological views and values political parties².

Political values are not only ideals, but also clearly defined norms that should be adhered to. It is difficult to know them directly, but the objective embodiments fixed in the political sphere – political symbols – help here. Political manipulation and manipulative technologies (latent control of people’s political consciousness and behavior in order to force them (not) to act in the interests of manipulators), as a form of hidden influence, create a danger for political values in the mass consciousness. The purpose of manipulation is to obtain, implement, and preserve power. It is successful when the objects of manipulation – the masses are sure that everything in society is natural and inevitable, when the contenders for power influence the formation of the necessary public opinion for them. Often, these methods of influence operate outside the legal framework, which leads to problems in society, social tension. Achieving power requires attracting and retaining attention and creating a favorable image of political leaders.

¹ Бабич-Декань О. (1999). Проблема використання політичного Паблік Рідейшнз у системі технологічного забезпечення сучасної соціальної політики. Вісник УАДУ. № 2. С. 225.

² Що обіцяють виборцям українські партії. URL: https://lb.ua/news/2014/10/14/282470_lyustratsiya_detsentralizatsiya.html

In Ukraine, power is obtained through elections and public support. Manipulators form voters' opinions about the support of a certain political force, guess social moods, and offer the optimal image of the candidate and the program. Here, political manipulation is the theory and practice of election technologies and the methods of conducting elections. Their strategy requires certain tactics: encouraging and retaining attention, creating a positive image of the candidate.

V. Amelin highlights in political manipulation: the introduction of content desirable for a certain group into the public consciousness under the guise of objective information; the impact on the painful points of public consciousness that form fear and hatred; the implementation of declared and hidden plans that the manipulator associates with the support of his position of public opinion .

Political technologies are used to solve the tasks and goals of political manipulation. Manipulation tools are classified by the following criteria: those established by law and those outside the legal norms; by methods of influence – direct and hidden; by functions – PR and campaign activity; by shape – propaganda, economic, administrative, provocative; by content – (anti) advertising; by level of impact – interpersonal, group and large-scale; by information carrier – printed, electronic, out-of-home etc.

Means of manipulation are based on the creation of certain myths or ideas in the mass consciousness that support the interests of manipulators and are accepted by the majority with faith, without serious reflection. Although the era of blind faith in myths has passed, the reality shows that this is not the case. "If a modern person," writes E. Cassirer, "no longer believes in natural magic, then, no doubt, this person professes a kind of "social magic"³. New political myths are created according to a precise plan, social psychology of people and the goals of manipulators. E. Fromm wrote that political manipulation deprives a person of the ability to create a certain picture of the world, replacing it with an abstract mosaic of tendential and related facts⁴. M. Lerner believed that a person gets a complete confusion of concepts and no relationship of events. The only system in which a person is able to put individual facts – is the system of stereotypes formed previously, which is focused, in particular, on competition and struggle, where the concepts of good and evil are taken for granted⁵.

Manipulators seem to act openly, with slogans about the general good, but most of the times there is a hidden mechanism in their actions, goal, idea that others do not notice. V. Pugachev divides the manipulation of the person into two main types: open (overt) and hidden (latent). With the explicit nature of manipulation, goals are set and implemented openly, with the latent – they are silenced and hidden. The advantage of a certain type, according to the researcher, depends on the degree of different interests of those who rule and those who are ruled; the

³ Кассирер Э. (1990). Техника современных политических мифов. Вестник МГУ. Сер. 7 (философия). № 2. С. 17.

⁴ Лернер М. (1992). Развитие цивилизации в Америке. Образ жизни и мысли в Соединенных Штатах сегодня / Пер. с англ. В 2-х томах. Том 2. М.: Радуга. С. 219.

⁵ Фромм Э. (2006). Бегство от свободы / Пер. с англ. М.: АСТ: АСТ Москва. С. 46.

civilization of society (the use of force, direct coercion in the public consciousness); opportunities and skills of the ruling elite to implement various ways of covert influence on the masses⁶.

Interaction of the type of political system and the development of manipulation technologies. Political manipulation is affected by the type of political system, how conflicts are resolved in it, and how political protests are prevented. The manipulation process has the following phases: arousing interest in the potential object of manipulation for actions, words of the manipulator; gaining the trust of the object of influence; intriguing the object of influence; distraction maneuver (switching attention to a minor detail; reporting sensational news that does not concern the case); substitution, concealment (words, actions, object); stating a fabricated result; hidden or explicit prompting of the object of manipulation to actions or behavior needed by the manipulator.

To root social myths, manipulation technologies have a rich arsenal of methods for influencing people's minds: direct manipulation of facts, silencing unwanted information, half-truths, spreading slander, labeling, etc. Another example of mass democracy simulation is the substitution of appealing to the public consciousness through expert manipulation of ratings. The ratings of a sample survey are only a model of the real opinion of the masses, which experts allegedly "animate" (the method of fragmentation is the presentation of information in a single stream; "white noise" – reducing the perception of facts through a large number of news, when it is difficult to sort them; method of creating facts—a combination of real and fictional facts; method of historical analogies; method of "throwing mud", which gives a negative ethical assessment to the subject of conversation; method of semantic manipulation, etc.)⁷.

The power of using disinformation is that it is involved at the moment of making an important decision, and when the truth comes out – the goal of disinformation will already be achieved. Refuting misinformation does not affect the current psychological attitude that has developed. For each genre of information, along with the general means of manipulation, there are special ones. So, in order to create a repulsive attitude towards undesirable politicians, TV uses unattractive angles of them or edits the footage accordingly.

The most high-quality messages of technologists appeal to the unconscious, manipulate fears and desires, do it latently, creating an "alibi for the consciousness." A natural mechanism of psychological protection of a person helps the technologists – it prevents information overload, blocking unpleasant, alien, incomprehensible. However, bypassing the blocked consciousness, messages get into the subconscious and continue to determine behavior. In conditions of information overload – and this is the norm now – the protective mechanism also works for important messages that are perceived critically under other conditions: when the protective mechanism operates, the analytical apparatus is disabled⁸. A skillfully composed message gets directly into the subconscious and, in the ideal course of actions for the technologist, becomes a guide to certain

⁶ Пугачов В.П.(2003). Технологии скрытого управления в современной российской политике. Вестник Московского университета. Сер. 12. Политические науки. № 3. С. 69.

⁷ Бебик В. (1995). Політичний маркетинг. Політологічні читання: Українсько – канадський шоквартальник. Київ. № 2. С. 199.

⁸ Борисенко И.(1996). О роли опросов и негативной рекламы в президентской кампании: (США). Компас. № 12. С. 57.

activity. American researcher J. Keller writes that messages directed at women use attributes of female sexuality as a powerful taboo. For example, a diet Pepsi-Cola tin, which is used mainly by women, is painted with bubbles and ice cubes so that you can see a fairly clear image of a woman's breast. Messages aimed at men are full of attributes of male sexuality⁹.

Emotionally colored, repressed information settles in the memory for a long time. The strongest emotions are related to sex and death. "Fallen for an idea" always add weight to an ideology. The effect of the death motive depends on the skill of the technologist. In the newspaper "Facts" it is combined with the sexual motive. Almost every issue of the newspaper contains a report about another bloody crime, the victims of which are "ordinary people", and on the last page—a there is a mandatory portrait of a naked beauty. And, of course, information "on political topics" which is presented like a background, therefore acts more effectively¹⁰.

Boundary states of consciousness are marked by an increased tendency for suggestion. These states are effectively created by sound and light of certain frequencies. This determined the popularity of advertising at concerts, attracting musicians to election campaigns. Such techniques have been actively used in Ukraine in the last decade. But often candidates act according to the old scheme: first, candidates come out, make solemn speeches, and then there is a concert. This is how the candidates' tour with the "Chervona Ruta" singers was organized. But the election programs did nothing but irritate the audience. Image-makers did not think to create an altered state of consciousness first, and then "launch" the messages. This technique was completely mastered during the "promotion" of the referendum in 2000. Between the musical numbers, the hosts called out the following slogan: "Let's say "Yes" to the referendum!". And the rhythm of the music also fell under the definition of "hypnotic"¹¹. This technology was used in the presidential election campaign of 2004 by the candidate V. Yanukovych.

Electoral technologies are corrective technologies for the development of society that operate exclusively before elections, with high tension, uncompromising competition, and a lack of time. Candidates are tempted to use any means of influencing voters. Therefore, media often write about "clear" and "dirty" methods of political struggle and manipulation. In this sense "classic" technologies are for falsifying electoral documents, simple bribery of voters, influence on the subconscious, psychological pressure on a competitor through the use of compromising material, and moral or physical elimination of competitors¹². The conditions under which such technologies operate – are thorough conspiracy, information pressure, and distraction of public attention to minor events.

The practice of electoral technologies is an objective consequence of transformations in the CIS countries. The incompleteness of the legislative framework, the weakness of the state,

⁹ Бурбан Ю.(1998).Проблеми законодавчого регулювання політичної реклами. Економіка. Фінанси. Право. №7. С. 29-30.

¹⁰ Власенко О.(1997).Пропонуємо виборчі технології: (Лабораторія сучасних виборчих технологій при Фонді сприяння місцевому самоврядуванню в Україні). Урядовий кур'єр. 11 груд. С. 6.

¹¹ Войтенко В. П.(1999). Виборчі технології у дзеркалі математики/ Передмов. А. С. Матвієнко; Інститут відкритої політики. Київ. С. 9.

¹² Геслі В.(2000).Чинники впливу на голосування українських виборців. Політична думка. № 3. С. 21.

and the immaturity of civil society in Ukraine not only allowed, but also stimulated the use of successful electoral technologies, according to their authors and users¹³. But in life, the victory by manipulating the minds of voters, achieving power at any cost, removing citizens from making a fateful decision did not benefit either the people, which was always obvious, or the winners in the struggle for power. This was obvious when they were dealing with vital problems of society, and sometimes it led to tragedies for the winners themselves.

The general result of using such shocking electoral technologies is always tension in society, and the lack of use of the creative potential of the people. The use of the described and similar shock, time- and space-focused selective technologies increases social entropy, creates grounds to define them as dirty and to oppose them with a worthy alternative¹⁴.

Now in Ukraine, objective prerequisites are maturing for the transition from “dirty” to “clear” electoral technologies. Global shifts towards a knowledge-based information society are also very important for Ukrainians. It is knowledge and experience that affect those who use news from TV, because according to research, TV loses the blind trust of its users. Respondents who do not trust the Ukrainian media explain their position, first of all, by the fact that the media is owned by oligarchs (43.4%), and by the fact that the Ukrainian government exerts pressure on the media (43.2%), second of all, among the reasons for distrust of the domestic media, respondents named the lack of representation of different points of view in the media (12.5%), and third of all – unsatisfactory content (11.9%).

The 2019 presidential election in Ukraine. However, the 2019 presidential election in Ukraine demonstrated a combination of manipulative, “dirty” electoral technologies and time- and space-distributed “clear” technologies¹⁵. It is through the widespread use of smart electoral technologies, the use of domestic and international knowledge, that Ukraine can make a “transformational leap” in relation to other countries of the world. “Clear” electoral technologies, as opposed to the “dirty” ones, maximize the creative and active energy of all citizens, without exception, in the processes of solving urgent problems of the state¹⁶. The “clear” electoral technologies are open; transparent; understandable; constructive; ordered; democratic; state-orientated¹⁷.

Ukraine will be able to move from the “dirty” to “clear” electoral technologies if it opens access to domestic and international knowledge to citizens about everyday life and strategic development of municipalities; if local communities are able to resist the use of “dirty” technologies against them; learn how to implement “clear” technologies and mechanisms for

¹³ Дем'яненко М. (2001). Вибори і новітні інформаційні технології (Інформатизація виборчих процесів). Голос України. 28 лютого.

¹⁴ Динес В., Николаев А. (2000). Административные технологии в региональных избирательных кампаниях: [Региональные выборы в России в 2000 г.]. Власть. № 9. С. 25.

¹⁵ Костенко Н. (1999). Мас-медіа у виборах: ціннісні орієнтації політичної сфери: [Медіа-культура у політ. сфері]. Політична думка. № 4. С. 100-120.

¹⁶ Почепцов Г. (2000). Це солодке слово – сакторат: [Роль політ. реклами партій під час проведення вибор. кампаній]. День. 21 груд.

¹⁷ Почепцов Г. (1997). Політична реклама України: стратегії виграшу чи програшу. Київський ун-т ім. Т. Г. Шевченка. Вісник. Сер. Журналістика. Київ. Вип. 5. С. 34-36.

implementing election programs of winners; apply life management and social development technologies as “clear” electoral technologies.

This approach to organizing and implementing electoral processes is common in countries with stable institutions of power, society, and business. There is an unshakable principle of winning power: the day after the victory is the first day of the subsequent election campaign. The winning government, fulfilling its obligations to the voters, constantly carefully monitors the election rating. And the press, political parties, public organizations, and the opposition use their pressure to encourage the government to perform its functions. These circumstances create social barriers against the use of “dirty” electoral technologies and create conditions for the emergence of “clear” technologies, so to speak, in a natural way, based on traditions and political culture.

Modern democracy is impossible without elections, and therefore without “political manipulation” of public opinion. Still, the media should not “break away” from the society whose interests they should express. Otherwise, the media becomes a means of political influence of their owners and managers, and all other citizens are deprived of a real opportunity for public expression. Management and politics have now “diverged”. There was a differentiation of functions of depoliticized professional managers and the so-called public politicians – those who directly “live” the politics.

As a result of the elections, there is no longer a change of officials-experts who carry out routine management work in the “corridors of power”. The public politicians – the media image holders – are the ones to change. And power is not given to those who understand public problems and can offer effective solutions to them, but who have managed to “sell” themselves to the largest number of voters.

The 2019 presidential election campaign was significantly different from the previous ones that took place in Ukraine. The large number of presidential candidates (44), the absence of two clear leaders who should enter the second round, new channels of communication with voters and the active participation of non-professional politicians made this campaign an exceptional phenomenon in the history of the Ukrainian electoral process. We believe that there had been several reasons for this.

The first one is an external factor that had a significant impact on Ukraine. With the election of D. Trump as the President of the United States, new trends appeared in the election campaigns of countries around the world. D. Trump is not a classic politician, he is primarily a showman who accurately caught the mood of the nation and tried to respond to it. Trump’s case is not unique – we see the same in Europe, where so-called “anti-system” parties and politicians have become popular. They are gaining more and more votes in parliamentary elections and claiming the positions of heads of state. Examples of anti-system parties and leaders are E. Macron in France, the “Five Star” Movement in Italy, and A. Babis in the Czech Republic. These politicians are difficult to classify as classic “left”, “right”, or “centrists”. They work with a voter who is disillusioned with politics and have a good result.

Consequently, the main trend of the elections of recent years is the fatigue of societies from traditional politicians and their rhetoric.

The second reason is the technologies that affect the electoral process. We know about the activities of “Cambridge Analytica” company and their “big data” project, which collected dossiers on 200 million Americans¹⁸.

Political technologies are used in all elections: social networks can now be compared in influence with the leading media, a smartphone has now become the main source of news, the collection of voter data is put on stream and the result of the election depends largely on the quality of this data. Classical sociology and political science can no longer keep up with technological progress and cannot clearly explain what is happening. The election campaign is very dynamic and is becoming more and more like a show with elements of marketing. This was also the case in Ukraine according to the survey “3D profiles of participants of the presidential elections-2019”¹⁹, by the sociological company “Center for Applied Research”. According to the study, 73% of Ukrainians older than 18 years old are actively interested in politics. A new trend is the “rejuvenation” of interest in politics. The most active electoral group, in addition to pensioners and voters aged 55+, is the group of voters between 35-44 years old²⁰.

According to the same research, the Internet, as a news source, caught up with the TV for the first time in 2018. Almost 70% of voters receive information from TV and the web, often combining these two sources. At the same time, Facebook as a source of news has overtaken traditional online media. Thus, 49% of voters receive information from Facebook, and 43.5% from online media. The popularity of Facebook is clearly correlated with such a news source as friends/acquaintances – 48.6% of voters receive information from them. These data indicate an increase in distrust of traditional media and an increase in the role of informal communication²¹.

This is especially evident in the age range below 35 years old, where the Internet ranks first as a channel for getting information about politics, and here social networks are leading by a significant margin. In the 35-44 years old category, the Internet is perceived on an equal footing with TV; after 45 years old, the share of the Internet as a source of information is less, the main channel of communication is TV. The 65+ year old group has newspapers competing with TV²². “Electoral fatigue” and the development of new communications have significantly changed the electoral process. This explains the high rating of the candidate for President of Ukraine V.

¹⁸ Как *Cambridge Analytica* «выиграла» выборы дядя Трамп: *The Guardian*. URL: <https://meduza.io/feature/2018/03/23/kak-cambridge-analytica-vyigrala-vybory-dlya-trampa-the-guardian>

¹⁹ Соціологічне дослідження «3D-профілі учасників президентських виборів-2019». URL: https://www.google.com/search?xsrf=ACYBGNRr03ewV_kLruLLRjxP9KuFNEL4zQ%3A1582054720429&source=hp&ci=QD1MXrOzGKqOrwS3x

²⁰ Хто ті виборці, які обрали Зеленського та голосували за Порошенка – соціологи дали характеристики електоратам обох кандидатів. URL: https://www.irf.ua/khto_ti_vibortsi_yaki_obrali_zelenskogo_ta_golosovali_za_poroshenka_sotsiologi_dali_kharakteristiki_elektoratam_obokh_kandidativ/

²¹ Стало відомо, яким джерелам новин надають перевагу українці. URL: <https://glavcom.ua/country/society/stalo-vidomo-jakim-dzherelam-novin-nadajut-perevagu-ukrajintsi-645276.html>

²² Понад чверть українців ще не знають за кого голосуватимуть на президентських виборах у 2019 році – дослідження. URL: <https://ua.interfax.com.ua/news/election2019/541361.html>

Zelensky, who clearly understood the society's request and tried to respond to it. It makes sense that that his campaign for the most part was online. He clearly focused on his voters and understood how to communicate with them.

And most Ukrainian politicians used online platforms to communicate with voters, primarily through Facebook advertising. Most active in this segment were Y. Tymoshenko, P. Poroshenko, O. Shevchenko, S. Taruta and A. Sadovyi. Their posts attracted millions of viewers and collected thousands of likes, shares, and comments. However, the analysis of the "targeting" of the advertising messages shows that all candidates chose all Ukrainian residents over 18 years old as their target audience. Almost none of the candidates segmented the audience and did not look for those who really should have been addressed this or that message. Consequently, this so-called "carpet bombing" of Facebook ads made politicians recognizable online, but this did not mean that likes became votes on the day of the election.

The experience of political Facebook campaigns in the USA and Europe shows that the main thing is to choose the right audience and focus on it the messages that interest it. The results of the 2019 presidential elections in Ukraine showed how new political technologies influenced their course and determined the result. New technologies collided with traditional technologies that have been operating in Ukraine for decades in this election, and the election results showed that they are much more effective.

Conclusions. Thus, summing up, it should be emphasized that the influence of manipulative electoral technologies on the political values of the population, on their decision in the course of elections, is quite important. In a post-industrial society, political manipulation, electoral technologies, and the power of information become crucial in managing society, since the vast majority of citizens perceive the world around them through the electoral process. Presidential election in Ukraine in 2019 has demonstrated a combination of manipulative, "dirty" electoral technologies and "clear" technologies distributed in time and space. The media and the Internet have become one of the most important public institutions, as well as the people involved in this process.

We believe that it is necessary to introduce "clear" electoral technologies into the political field of Ukraine, taking into account our social, political and economic realities and the rules of the game of the world environment. They must be created by intensive means, designed and implemented as science-intensive social engineering products.

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